Licensing, bonus terms and payment infrastructure in the Finnish market before the 2027 Gambling Act
Finland’s licensed gambling market opens on 1 July 2027. We audited all 400 casino brands in our Finnish-market database against the rules they will have to meet, then measured what those rules would actually cost the market against eighteen months of observed Finnish player behaviour. Most brands wouldn’t meet the rules, but the money has already moved to the ones that can.
In short
Only 28% of brands operating in Finland hold an EEA licence, while 96% of current bonus offers would breach the incoming 5× cap on wagering requirements. Yet 81% of what players deposit already goes to the minority EEA-licensed brands.
What this study covers
A structural audit of 400 casino brands actively marketed to Finnish players, covering 889 individual deposit-bonus offers, 515 brand-to-licence relationships, 4,911 brand-to-payment-method relationships and 23,156 brand-to-game-studio relationships.
A demand study covering the same market from the other side: 877 brands with measurable Finnish activity between January 2025 and June 2026.
All figures come from our own data, not operator marketing claims. The demand study is reported as shares and rates only, as we don’t publish monetary totals or individual brand figures. We set out the methodology and limitations in full at the end.
Licensing
28%
of brands serving Finnish players hold an EEA licence
That's 112 of 400 brands. Meanwhile, Curaçao alone accounts for 165.
Bonus terms
96%
of bonus offers exceed the incoming 5x wagering cap
That's 721 of 748 offers that disclose a multiple. The market mean is 37.2x.
Player demand
81%
of Finnish deposit value already goes to EEA-licensed brands
Against 61% of first-time deposits and 53% of clicks. Measured over 18 months.
Direction of travel
14.3%
of brands launched in 2026 hold an EEA licence
Down from 58.3% of the 2019 cohort, while annual launches rose from 12 to 94.
What actually changes on 1 July 2027
Finland is ending one of Europe’s last gambling monopolies, but only partially. Under the new Gambling Act (Rahapelilaki 10/2026), betting, online casino games, online slots and online bingo are open to licensed competition, while Veikkaus Oy retains its exclusive right to lotteries, scratch cards and all land-based slot machines and casino games [1]. The National Police Board began accepting licence applications on 1 March 2026, and licensed operations can begin on 1 July 2027, when the Finnish Supervisory Agency takes over as regulator [3].
For an operator, the entry cost is known: a non-refundable application fee of €29,000, an annual supervision fee scaled to gaming revenue between €4,000 and €434,000, and a licence term of up to five years [1]. Applicants must satisfy fitness-and-propriety criteria that extend to board members, executive management and anyone holding 25% or more of the shares or voting rights. Non-EEA applicants must appoint an EEA representative meeting the same standards.
The commercial cost is where the model breaks. Welcome bonuses — the single most common customer-acquisition instrument in the market today — will be prohibited outright. Bonus money may be offered only to customers with an established relationship, must be offered on equal terms to all such customers, must remain moderate in amount and may carry a wagering requirement of no more than five times the bonus [2]. Loyalty schemes and VIP programmes that reward volume of play or deposit size will also be prohibited. So will affiliate marketing, influencer marketing and direct telephone marketing [1].
That last prohibition includes sites like this one. We have no commercial future in the Finnish market as it is currently constituted, which is precisely why we think the data is worth publishing while we still hold it.
“Every trade publication has covered what the rules say. Almost nobody has measured what the rules do to the market that exists. Those are very different questions, and only one of them can be answered with a database.”
Finding 1: Most of the market has no European regulatory footing
Of the 400 brands in the dataset, 112 (28%) hold at least one licence from a regulator inside the EEA. The remaining 288 hold only offshore authorisations, or none we could identify. The single most common licence in the Finnish-facing market is Curaçao eGaming, held by 165 brands. Anjouan (a licensing regime that barely existed three years ago) accounts for another 105.
- EEA regulator
- Offshore or none
- Other regulators combined
Number of brands holding a licence from each jurisdiction Scale runs to 200.
Show data table Hide data table
| Jurisdiction | Brands |
|---|---|
| Curaçao eGaming | 165 |
| Anjouan Gaming License | 105 |
| Malta Gaming Authority | 62 |
| Estonian Tax and Customs Board | 46 |
| Costa Rica | 41 |
| Kahnawake Gaming Commission | 32 |
| Tobique License | 21 |
| No licence recorded | 12 |
| Germany (GGL) | 5 |
| UK Gambling Commission | 5 |
| Other regulators (9 combined) | 18 |
Source: Kasinohai casino dataset.
An offshore licence is not in itself a bar to a Finnish licence. The Act does not require applicants to hold an EEA authorisation, only to meet its own fitness criteria and, if based outside the EEA, to appoint a representative residing within the EEA. But it is a strong proxy for the corporate substance the process demands. A brand operating on a Curaçao or Anjouan authorisation typically has no EEA establishment, no audited European accounts and no prior experience of a regulator that can fine it up to 4% of turnover. Clearing €29,000 in application fees is trivial, whereas clearing a fitness-and-propriety review that reaches every 25% shareholder is not.
One useful tell is in the data. Our dataset flags whether winnings from a brand are tax-free for Finnish players (a status that depends on the operator being licensed inside the EEA). Exactly 103 brands carry that flag, and every one of them sits in the EEA-licensed group. No offshore-licensed brand offers Finnish players tax-free winnings. However, the regulatory split is not an abstraction, as it already determines what a Finnish player actually takes home.
Finding 2: The newest brands are the least licensable
This is the finding that surprised us most, and it is the one we would most like other researchers to test against their own data.
Brand formation in the Finnish-facing market has accelerated sharply: There were 12 new brands in 2019, 52 in 2023, 78 in 2024, 94 in 2025, and 35 in the first half of 2026 alone. Over the same period, the proportion of each cohort holding an EEA licence has fallen from 58.3% to 14.3%.
- Holds an EEA licence
Percentage of brands launched that year holding at least one EEA licence
Show data table Hide data table
| Launch year | New brands | With EEA licence | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 4 | 1 | 25% |
| 2017 | 6 | 1 | 16.7% |
| 2018 | 11 | 3 | 27.3% |
| 2019 | 12 | 7 | 58.3% |
| 2020 | 25 | 12 | 48% |
| 2021 | 31 | 9 | 29% |
| 2022 | 33 | 13 | 39.4% |
| 2023 | 52 | 22 | 42.3% |
| 2024 | 78 | 15 | 19.2% |
| 2025 | 94 | 14 | 14.9% |
| 2026 | 35 | 5 | 14.3% |
Source: Kasinohai casino dataset.
When reading the two series together, the pattern is unambiguous. The 2019 cohort was small and majority EEA-licensed. The 2025 cohort is nearly eight times larger, with 85% offshore. In absolute terms, 2019 produced seven EEA-licensed brands; 2025, despite launching 94 brands, produced fourteen. The market has grown by adding almost exclusively the category of operators least able to survive licensing.
The obvious reading is that it’s a deliberate land-grab, with a gradually closing window, low barriers to launching an offshore brand and a finite period in which to acquire Finnish players before the rules change. The less obvious reading (and the one we favour) is that these are not really 288 independent businesses. Brand proliferation on shared offshore infrastructure is cheap, and a single operator can run dozens of front-ends. If that’s happening, the number of distinct corporate entities facing the licensing decision is far smaller than 400, and consolidation after July 2027 will be correspondingly more abrupt.
Our demand data lets us test that interpretation, because it records how long each brand actually stayed in the market rather than when it says it was founded. Taking every brand that converted its first Finnish player during 2024 (so that both groups are observed over an identical window), the 138 offshore brands in that cohort remained commercially active for a median of 6 months. The 57 EEA-licensed brands lasted 12 months, twice as long. The numbers show that 31.2% of the offshore cohort was gone within three months, against 17.5% of the EEA cohort, and 50.9% of EEA brands were still trading a year on, against 25.4%.
That is not the behaviour of businesses building a position in a market about to be regulated. A brand with a six-month commercial life is not going to file a €29,000 application for a licence that takes effect in 2027. Much of the offshore tail is already churning itself out of the market without any help from the legislation, which means the disruption attributed to the reform will partly be a process that’s already underway.
“A market that adds 94 brands in a year and 14 EEA licences in the same year is not maturing. It’s being harvested before it closes.”
Finding 3: The money has already moved to the licensable minority
Counting brands overstates the disruption, because not all brands are equal. To measure what they are actually worth, we switched datasets: eighteen months of observed Finnish player behaviour across 877 brands, from the click that leaves this site to the deposits the player subsequently makes.
The result is the single most important finding in this study, and brand counts can’t produce it. EEA-licensed brands take 53.3% of Finnish outbound clicks, 60.8% of first-time deposits and 80.6% of everything Finnish players actually deposit. The further down the funnel you look (and the more the measure weights money rather than headcount), the more European the Finnish market becomes.
- EEA-licensed
- Offshore or unlicensed
Show data table Hide data table
| Stage | EEA-licensed | Offshore or unlicensed |
|---|---|---|
| Outbound clicks | 53.3% | 46.7% |
| First-time deposits | 60.8% | 39.2% |
| Deposit value | 80.6% | 19.4% |
Source: Kasinohai observed-demand data, January 2025 – June 2026. Shares only; volumes not published..
This is not a reporting artefact. Restricting the same calculation to the 536 brands that report all three measures moves the figures by less than two points (55%, 61.1% and 81.1% respectively). That means the gap between attention and money reflects the market rather than who reports what.
The first step of the gap is a straightforward conversion difference. EEA-licensed brands turn a thousand Finnish clicks into 27.3 first-time depositors, while offshore brands manage 20.5. On the same visitor, from the same page, a licensed brand is a third more efficient at converting a Finnish player into a customer.
What happens after the first deposit is harder to characterise cleanly. That’s because deposit reporting is patchier than click reporting and the two cannot be safely divided. Among the brands that do report both, though, one contrast is stark enough to survive the caveat: the average offshore deposit is €92 against €39 at EEA-licensed brands, while the median offshore deposit is €39 against €30. A mean more than double the median describes a small number of very large transfers sitting on top of a mass of small ones, which is a pattern consistent with crypto-funded accounts and a direct corollary of Finding 6. Offshore deposits are less frequent and more heavily skewed towards occasional high-value transfers than those at licensed brands.
The gap is widening, not closing
Tracking the same three shares quarter by quarter since 2023 shows the offshore tail steadily winning the battle for attention, but steadily failing to convert it into money. The EEA share of clicks has fallen from 62.2% to 49%, meaning that offshore brands now take more than half of all Finnish clicks. Over the same period, the EEA share of deposit value has barely moved, from 92% to 84.1%.
- Share of deposit value
- Share of first-time deposits
- Share of outbound clicks
EEA-licensed share of each measure, by quarter
Show data table Hide data table
| Quarter | Deposit value | First-time deposits | Outbound clicks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 Q1 | 92% | 79% | 62.2% |
| 2023 Q2 | 91.9% | 77.2% | 66.2% |
| 2023 Q3 | 92.1% | 74.7% | 68.7% |
| 2023 Q4 | 89.9% | 76.8% | 67.8% |
| 2024 Q1 | 91.3% | 79.5% | 64.6% |
| 2024 Q2 | 90% | 75.6% | 66.4% |
| 2024 Q3 | 86.7% | 69.3% | 59% |
| 2024 Q4 | 84.1% | 64.7% | 58.8% |
| 2025 Q1 | 78.1% | 55.5% | 57.7% |
| 2025 Q2 | 77.4% | 60.8% | 54.9% |
| 2025 Q3 | 80.9% | 60.2% | 51.7% |
| 2025 Q4 | 83.8% | 68.3% | 52.7% |
| 2026 Q1 | 82.7% | 64.4% | 51% |
| 2026 Q2 | 84.1% | 67.5% | 49% |
Source: Kasinohai observed-demand data. Each series is the EEA-licensed share of that measure within the quarter..
The dip across 2025 is real and worth noting here. The EEA share of first-time deposits fell to 55.5% at its low point before recovering to 67.5%. Offshore brands are winning genuine Finnish customers, not merely wasted clicks. But they are winning the cheapest ones, and they are not holding them.
Fifty brands carry three-quarters of the market
The concentration behind these shares makes the licensing arithmetic tractable. Of the 605 brands that converted a Finnish player in the period, the top 50 account for 74.8% of all Finnish deposit value and the top 10 account for 31.7%.
Furthermore, those leading brands are almost uniformly licensable. Every one of the top ten holds an EEA licence. So do 42 of the top 50, against 41% across the wider market.
Cumulative share of Finnish deposit value held by the top N brands Scale runs to 100%.
Show data table Hide data table
| Top N brands | Share of Finnish deposit value | Holding an EEA licence |
|---|---|---|
| Top 10 | 31.7% | 10 of 10 (100%) |
| Top 25 | 56.6% | 22 of 25 (88%) |
| Top 50 | 74.8% | 42 of 50 (84%) |
| Top 100 | 89.5% | 77 of 100 (77%) |
| Top 200 | 97.1% | 124 of 200 (62%) |
| Top 300 | 99.1% | 156 of 300 (52%) |
Source: Kasinohai observed-demand data. Individual brands are not identified..
This materially changes the channelisation forecast. If Finnish demand were evenly spread across 400 brands, closing most of them would push an enormous volume of play toward unlicensed alternatives. It is not evenly spread. Four-fifths of the money is already with brands that hold a European licence, and three-quarters of it sits inside fifty brands. The channelisation problem Finland faces in 2027 is real but far smaller than a brand count implies. The binding policy question isn’t how many brands will disappear. Instead, it’s whether the bonus and marketing restrictions are severe enough to push the players at those fifty brands back out.
Finding 4: Virtually no current bonus offer would be lawful
Of the 889 deposit-bonus offers in the dataset, 748 disclose a wagering multiple. The mean is 37.2x and the median 35x. The incoming wagering cap for retention bonuses is 5x.
Exactly 27 offers (4% of those that disclose terms) sit at or below 5x. A further 119 offers disclose no wagering multiple at all.
- Within the incoming 5x cap
- Above the cap
- No multiple disclosed
Number of deposit-bonus offers in each wagering band Scale runs to 500.
Show data table Hide data table
| Wagering band | Offers |
|---|---|
| 0–5x | 27 |
| 6–20x | 26 |
| 21–35x | 457 |
| 36–50x | 225 |
| Over 50x | 35 |
| Not disclosed | 119 |
Source: Kasinohai casino dataset.
It would be reasonable to conclude that the offshore operators are the offenders here, and that EEA-licensed brands already run something closer to compliant terms. However, the data doesn’t support that reading.
- EEA regulator
- Offshore or none
Mean wagering multiple across all disclosed offers, by licensing jurisdiction Scale runs to 50x.
Show data table Hide data table
| Jurisdiction | Brands | Mean wagering |
|---|---|---|
| Tobique License | 11 | 40.3x |
| Curaçao eGaming | 113 | 38.6x |
| Malta Gaming Authority | 47 | 38.2x |
| UK Gambling Commission | 5 | 36.9x |
| Kahnawake Gaming Commission | 27 | 36.7x |
| Anjouan Gaming License | 95 | 36.1x |
| Costa Rica | 41 | 34.8x |
| Estonian Tax and Customs Board | 19 | 34.6x |
| No licence recorded | 12 | 30x |
Source: Kasinohai casino dataset; jurisdictions with five or more brands.
Malta Gaming Authority brands average 38.2x, which is higher than Anjouan (36.1x), Costa Rica (34.8x) and Kahnawake (36.7x). Estonian-licensed brands are among the mildest at 34.6x, but the spread across every jurisdiction is narrow: nine points separate the heaviest from the lightest, and all of them sit six to eight times above the statutory ceiling. Whatever a Finnish licence will do to bonus terms, the current regulatory landscape has not been doing it ahead of time.
The structural effect is larger than the multiple alone suggests. Half the market (201 brands) offers a single welcome bonus, but 188 brands chain three or more separate deposit offers into a multi-stage package, and two brands run packages of seven and ten stages. A player completing a four-stage package is subject to the wagering requirement four times over, on four separate deposits. Under the new regime, no part of that structure will be permitted: the staging, acquisition purpose, and multiple would all fail.
Finding 5: €635,731 of advertised value disappears
Aggregating the maximum advertised value of every welcome package across the 308 brands that run one totals €635,731, alongside 73,214 free spins. The average advertised package is €2,064; the largest single package advertises up to €40,000.
This figure needs careful handling, and we’d rather state its limits than see it misquoted. It’s a sum of advertised maxima, not of money any player receives or any operator pays out. Almost nobody deposits enough to trigger a maximum, and the wagering requirements documented above mean the expected cash value to a player is a small fraction of the headline. Read correctly, it measures the scale of the promotional apparatus that becomes unlawful on 1 July 2027, not a transfer of €635,731 away from Finnish consumers.
Read that way, it remains the most concrete measure of how much of this market’s customer-acquisition machinery is about to be switched off, and it is a number no operator publishes about itself.
“The welcome bonus was never really worth its face value. What made it powerful was that it was the only thing most of these brands had to say. Take it away, and several hundred of them have no remaining argument for why a Finnish player should choose them.”
Finding 6: The payment stack splits cleanly along the same line
Payment infrastructure is the sharpest single discriminator in the entire dataset.
Of the 288 offshore-licensed brands, 232 (81%) accept at least one cryptocurrency. Of the 112 EEA-licensed brands, five do. That isn’t a difference of degree. Instead, it’s two different industries using the same shopfront. Meanwhile, 102 of 112 EEA brands (91%) support a Finnish bank-identification rail (Zimpler, Brite, Trustly or Euteller), compared with 162 of 288 offshore brands (56%).
- Finnish bank-ID rail
- Cryptocurrency
- Conventional method
Number of brands supporting each payment method Scale runs to 500.
Show data table Hide data table
| Payment method | Brands |
|---|---|
| Bank transfer | 364 |
| Revolut | 320 |
| Mastercard | 287 |
| Visa | 285 |
| Ethereum | 237 |
| Bitcoin | 237 |
| Tether | 235 |
| Litecoin | 228 |
| Paysafecard | 226 |
| Neteller | 225 |
| Skrill | 194 |
| Zimpler | 170 |
Source: Kasinohai casino dataset.
This matters more than it appears to on first glance. Finland’s regime requires verified customer identity and enforceable self-exclusion. A brand built on cryptocurrency deposits and no bank-identification rail has built a customer-onboarding flow structurally incompatible with the obligations a licence imposes. Retrofitting that won’t be a simple payments integration project. It will be a rebuild of the account lifecycle.
Two further business models sit on the same fault line. Loyalty and VIP programmes (which the Act prohibits where they reward volume of play or deposit size) run at 226 of 288 offshore brands and 69 of 112 EEA ones. Pay N Play (the deposit-and-play flow that made Finnish and Swedish operators distinctive) appears at 201 brands, split almost evenly across both tiers, and its future depends entirely on whether bank-identification satisfies the Act’s verification requirements. That’s the single most consequential unresolved question in the reform for Finnish-facing operators, and nothing in the published guidance settles it.
What the licensed market plausibly looks like
Combining the constraints gives a defensible upper bound. We start from 112 EEA-licensed brands, i.e., those with existing European corporate substance. Then, if we require a Finnish bank-identification rail, 102 remain. If we require the absence of a crypto-first onboarding flow, the number barely moves. That’s because the two attributes are almost mutually exclusive in practice.
Roughly one hundred brands satisfy the structural preconditions today. Not all will apply. At €29,000 per application plus annual supervision fees, an operator running several brands will consolidate rather than license each one. Set against that background, some offshore operators with real balance sheets will restructure specifically to qualify, and some European operators absent from the Finnish grey market will enter it precisely because it is becoming regulated.
The demand data puts a floor under that estimate from the other direction. Fifty brands already carry 74.8% of Finnish deposit value, and 42 of those fifty hold an EEA licence today. A licensed market consisting of those brands alone would reproduce roughly three-quarters of the current market’s deposits, which is to say that the structural upper bound of a hundred and the demand-side requirement of about fifty converge on the same answer from opposite directions.
Our central estimate is that the Finnish licensed market opens with between 40 and 80 active consumer-facing brands, down from 400 today. On the demand side, the contraction is far milder: those 40-80 brands already account for the large majority of Finnish deposit value. Finland will lose roughly 80% of its brands and something closer to a fifth of the money currently flowing through its grey market. The open question is how much of that fifth channels into licensed operators rather than out of the regulated market entirely.
“Sweden channelised well above 90% at launch in 2019 and has been arguing about the number ever since. Finland starts from a stronger position than the brand count suggests, because Finnish players have already voted with their deposits. The risk isn’t the 288 brands that disappear. It’s whether the bonus rules are strict enough to make the licensed product feel worse than the unlicensed one.”
Methodology
This study draws on two separate datasets. Findings 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 are a structural audit: what brands are, taken from our editorial database. Finding 3 is a demand study: what Finnish players did, taken from operator-reported activity. The two cover deliberately different brand universes, and neither figure should be read as a restatement of the other.
The structural dataset
Our structured record of casino brands marketed to Finnish players, captured on 2026-07-13. It comprises 400 brands, 889 deposit-bonus offers, 515 brand-to-licence relationships, 4911 brand-to-payment-method relationships and 23156 brand-to-game-studio relationships. Our editorial team records licence, bonus and payment attributes from operator terms and conditions and licence registers, and reviews them on a rolling basis.
“EEA-licensed” means a brand holds at least one licence from a regulator inside the European Economic Area: Malta, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Romania, Cyprus, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Spain or Åland. The UK Gambling Commission is classified as non-EEA, reflecting the UK’s withdrawal from the EEA in 2020. Wagering figures use the deposit-bonus wagering multiple as published by the operator; where an operator applies the multiple to the deposit plus the bonus rather than the bonus alone, the effective requirement is higher than recorded here, so our figures are conservative.
The demand dataset
Finding 3 and the survival analysis in Finding 2 use daily brand-level activity for Finland between 2025-01-01 and 2026-06-30, covering 877 brands with measurable Finnish activity. Clicks are our own measurement. Operators report deposits, depositor counts and deposit values to us under standard affiliate reporting, which is why this dataset can see what players did after they left, and the structural dataset cannot.
This universe is larger than the 400-brand structural audit because it includes every brand with observable Finnish activity in the period, including brands never editorially listed on the site, and brands that have since left the market. It is not a subset or a superset of the structural audit; the two answer different questions.
Three method notes. Ratios are only ever computed over rows reporting both of their inputs, because reporting completeness varies by field and by operator, and dividing a densely reported measure by a sparsely reported one produces a meaningless number. The funnel shares in Finding 3 are reported alongside the same calculation restricted to brands reporting all three measures, so readers can see the reporting bias directly rather than take our word for its size. The survival analysis is cohort-matched (restricted to brands whose first Finnish conversion fell in 2024) so that both licence tiers are observed over an identical window and any trend in our own traffic affects them equally.
What we don’t publish. This dataset is commercially sensitive, and the study is an industry statistical report rather than a disclosure about our own business. The demand findings are therefore reported strictly as shares, rates and per-deposit averages. We don’t publish monetary totals of any kind, traffic or deposit volumes, figures for individual brands or operators, and nothing broken down by website or commercial arrangement. Researchers who need to assess statistical power directly are welcome to contact the author.
Limitations
- This isn’t a census. The dataset covers brands we actively track for the Finnish market, and doesn’t cover every site reachable from Finland. Brands with no affiliate presence are systematically absent, for example, and those are disproportionately likely to be unlicensed. The true offshore share of the market is, therefore, higher than the 72% reported here, not lower.
- Demand data reflects players who came through us. These are comparison-shoppers arriving via search, and they may select for regulatory quality more strongly than the Finnish player population as a whole. The 80.6% deposit-value share for EEA-licensed brands should be read as an upper bound on how concentrated Finnish demand really is. The direction of the bias is knowable even if its size is not: our audience is more informed than average, so a less informed population would sit further offshore.
- Deposit values are operator-reported and unaudited. They come from operators’ own affiliate reporting, with the incentives that implies, and completeness varies between operators. Under-reporting is more likely than over-reporting, and more likely at offshore brands than licensed ones, which would mean the EEA share of deposit value is somewhat overstated here. The robustness check in Finding 3 bounds this effect but does not eliminate it entirely.
- Brand survival measures presence in our data, not corporate death. A brand that stops converting Finnish players through us may have changed affiliate strategy rather than closed or left the Finnish market. The cohort matching in Finding 2 ensures this affects both licence tiers equally, so the gap between them stands and the absolute lifespans should be read as a floor.
- An EEA licence is a proxy, not a prediction. The Act does not require one. We use it as the best available indicator of corporate substance, and it will misclassify both ways: some offshore operators will qualify, and some EEA-licensed brands won’t apply.
- Bonus values are advertised maxima. They measure promotional scale, not money paid to players. See Finding 5.
- Launch years are brand-level. A brand’s recorded establishment year does not distinguish a genuinely new operator from a new front-end on existing infrastructure, which underpins the consolidation argument in Finding 2; the data supports it but does not prove it.
Reuse
Journalists and researchers are welcome to reproduce any figure or chart from this study with attribution and a link to this page. For the underlying aggregate tables, or for questions about the method, contact the author.
References
- [1] Borenius Attorneys Ltd. Finland’s Gambling Act Reform: A Practical Guide to the New Licensing Regime (accessed 2026-07-30).
- [2] Nordic Law. Marketing in Finland’s Reformed Gambling System (accessed 2026-07-30).
- [3] Finnish National Police Board (Poliisihallitus). Gambling licences — application process and timetable (accessed 2026-07-30).
- [4] Yogonet International. Kasinohai analyses welcome bonuses at 50 online casinos as Finland prepares gambling market overhaul (accessed 2026-07-30).
- [5] ICLG / Global Legal Group. Gambling Laws and Regulations Report 2026 — Finland (accessed 2026-07-30).